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Abstract 
Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver fails to see how to solve a 
problem and then – “aha!” – there is a sudden realization how to solve it. Two 
contemporary theories have been proposed to explain insight. The representational 
change theory (e. g., Knoblich et al., 2001) proposes that insight occurs through relaxing 
self-imposed constraints on a problem, and by decomposing chunked items in the 
problem. The progress monitoring theory (e. g., MacGregor et al., 2001) proposes that 
insight is only sought once it becomes apparent that the distance to the goal is 
unachievable in the moves remaining. These two theories are tested in an unlimited move 
problem, to which neither theory has previously been applied. The results lend support to 
both, but experimental manipulations to the problem suggest that the representational 
change theory is the better indicator of performance. The findings suggest that testable 
opposing predictions can be made to examine theories of insight, and that the use of eye 
movement data is a fruitful method of both examining insight and testing theories of 
insight. 
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Introduction 
Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver fails to see how to solve 
a problem and then – “aha!” – there is a sudden realization how to solve it. The 
realization of how to solve the problem is usually preceded by an impasse (Kaplan & 
Simon, 1990), where the problem solver becomes stuck and cannot see how to solve the 
problem. The impasse often consists of either a period of time where no problem solving 
activity takes place, or where the same problem solving activity is repeated time and 
again. Insight is an interesting phenomenon because the subsequent solving of the 
problem means that the problem solver was competent enough to accomplish the task to 
begin with, begging the questions of why they encountered an impasse and how their 
insight was gained (Ohlsson, 1992). 
Insight has been demonstrated on numerous occasions within problem solving. 
Maier (1931) used a task where two pieces of string were attached to a ceiling but were 
far enough apart so as they could not both be held at the same time. The task was to tie 
the pieces of string together. Various objects were located in the room, the solution being 
to tie an object to one of the pieces of string so that a pendulum motion can be achieved. 
Problem solvers in this task had great difficulty in solving it, the majority requiring a hint 
(the experimenter “accidentally” brushing against the string to cause a swinging motion) 
before they had the insight for how to solve the problem. Duncker (1945) gave the task of 
mounting a candle onto a vertical screen, with various objects being provided such as a 
box of nails and a book of matches. The insight here is to realize that the box can be used 
outside of its main function (i. e., as the base on which to place the candle, rather than for 
holding nails). 
Perhaps the most common insight problem solving task is the nine-dot problem 
(e. g., Scheerer, 1963). Nine dots are arranged in a three-by-three two-dimensional square 
with the task being to use a pen to bisect all of the dots using four lines only, without 
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taking the pen off the paper and without retracing any lines or parts of lines. In 
experiments which use the standard version of the problem as outlined, no participants 
are able to solve the problem, even when they are given ten minutes to solve it (Burnham 
& Davis, 1969) or given one hundred attempts in which to solve it (Weisberg & Alba, 
1981). The solution can be achieved by realizing that lines have to be drawn that go 
beyond the imagined outline of the square, although explicitly informing participants of 
this does not necessarily lead to an improved performance (Weisberg & Alba, 1981). 
The Progress Monitoring Theory 
MacGregor, Ormerod, and Chronicle (2001) propose a theory of insight problem 
solving based around the hill-climbing idea that problem solving proceeds with the 
problem solver seeking to minimize the gap between the current state of the problem and 
the goal state. Impasse will only occur when the problem solver finds that the hill- 
climbing method does not give rise to the solution, and it is only at this point that 
alternative approaches will be considered. 
Insight in MacGregor et al. ’s theory is governed by examining the difference 
between the current state of the problem and the goal state (or even a sub-goal state), and 
comparing this with the number of moves that are remaining with which to solve the 
problem (or to reach the sub-goal state). When there is a large distance between the 
current state and the goal state with only a small number of moves remaining, then it is 
likely that criterion failure will be reached. Criterion failure is a failure to reach a 
minimum distance from the current state to the goal state. When criterion failure occurs, 
there is a high potential that the problem solver will seek alternative solutions. This is one 
area where individual differences may occur in insight problem solving (where “insight 
potential” varies across individuals). 
For the nine dot problem, MacGregor et al. state that problem solvers will seek to 
maximize the number of dots they cross out with each successive line that they draw. The 
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minimum amount of dots that must be crossed out is just over two on average (nine dots 
to cross out using four lines). As it is quite easy to cross out three dots with the first line, 
and two with the next two lines, then for the first three moves there is never a large 
difference between the current state of the problem (in terms of how many uncrossed dots 
exist) and the number of moves remaining (in terms of how many lines have yet to be 
drawn). Criterion failure is only encountered on the fourth and final move. The poor 
performance on the nine dot problem is therefore explained by criterion failure being 
reached too late, rather than because the problem solver imposes an unnecessary 
constraint of keeping lines within the bounds of the square. Only when problem solvers 
have the capacity to look several moves ahead of themselves will they reach criterion 
failure sooner, at which point they may realize alternative solutions where some of the 
lines end outside of the nine dot square. This is another area where individual differences 
may occur - problem solvers’ capacity to “lookahead”. 
MacGregor and colleagues have demonstrated that their theory can predict the 
observed behavior of participants in several insight problem solving domains by 
manipulating the problem to be easier or harder with respect to the theory’s predictions. 
In the nine dot problem, MacGregor and colleagues gave participants the standard nine- 
dot square but with a line on the solution path already drawn in. Contrary to previous 
explanations but consistent with their theory, a line extending horizontally across the top 
three dots and extending outward to a non-dot point showed worse performance than a 
diagonal line from the top left dot to the bottom right dot. Previous explanations would 
expect the former to be more of an aid to solving the problem because it removes the 
“lines have to be within the square” constraint, whereas the model’s prediction is that the 
diagonal line forces alternative solutions to be sought more quickly (because drawing 
another two lines while keeping lines inside the square would only cross out a maximum 
of three more dots, whereas the horizontal line means four can be crossed out). 
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Ormerod, MacGregor, and Chronicle (2002) apply the theory to an eight-coin 
problem, whereby from an initial configuration of eight coins, two coins must be moved 
so that each of the eight coins touches three and only three other coins. The insight to the 
solution involves realizing that coins can be stacked on top of each other (the solution 
involves two sets of four coins, where each set has three coins touching each other with 
the final coin on top of the three). In a similar manner to their nine-dot experiments, 
Ormerod and colleagues show that it is the moves available that governs how quickly 
alternative solutions are sought. The problem is solved more quickly when there are no 
initial moves that will bring one coin touching three others than if there are several moves 
where a coin could be placed to touch three others. 
The Representational Change Theory 
Knoblich and colleagues (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius, 1999; Knoblich, 
Ohlsson & Raney, 2001) present a different view of why impasse occurs in problem 
solving, and how it is overcome. For Knoblich et al., the problem solver creates an initial 
representation of the problem that has a low probability of success. Representation can be 
thought of as the distribution of activation across pieces of knowledge in memory. The 
initial representation of the problem means that task knowledge that is not critical for 
solution becomes active rather than task knowledge that is critical for solution. It is only 
through altering this representation, and hence altering the activation of task knowledge, 
that subsequent success will be achieved. 
Knoblich et al. argue that the problem solver’s initial representation sets 
unnecessary constraints on their problem solving, and/or creates a representation of the 
problem which is not rich enough. Their constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition 
theory states that problems can be re-represented (and therefore impasse overcome) by 
relaxing the unnecessary constraints that have been placed on the problem, and/or 
decomposing chunked objects in the representation. Constraint relaxation can be thought 
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of in terms of a decrease in activation of a piece of knowledge that has acted as an 
unnecessary constraint on the problem. Chunk decomposition means the separation of 
those objects which can be broken down into further meaningful objects, such as a 
person’s telephone number being decomposed into the individual digits. Both constraint 
relaxation and chunk decomposition cause a change in the distribution of activation 
across pieces of knowledge (i. e., a re-representation of the problem). 
The theory has different levels of constraint and different levels of chunk. The most 
difficult constraint to relax is one whose scope covers the whole problem, because if this 
is the case then the whole problem representation needs to be revised. Local constraints 
are more likely to be relaxed first because they only affect a portion of the problem 
representation. In the case of chunks, loose chunks (i. e., chunks which decompose into 
further chunks) are more likely to be decomposed than tight chunks (i. e., chunks which 
decompose into entities which are not themselves chunks). 
Knoblich and colleagues (Knoblich et al., 1999; Knoblich et al., 2001) have used a 
matchstick algebra domain to test their predictions. Each problem is a numerical equation 
written out in Roman numerals using matchsticks, where a single match has to be moved 
in order to make the equation equal. Predictions based around the types of matchstick 
problem used confirmed the predictions of their theory, with local constraint problems 
being solved more quickly than global constraint problems, and loose chunk problems 
being solved more quickly than tight chunk problems. 
Purpose of the Present Study 
The two theories outlined above gain support from different domains within insight 
problem solving. The main support for the representational change theory is from one- 
step problems. Ohlsson (1992) has applied the theory to the nine dot problem but 
predictions from the theory are much clearer for the matchstick problem. The main 
support for the progress monitoring theory is from limited-move problems (in fact, the 
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theory is difficult to apply to single-step domains because it relies on the constant 
monitoring of progress in the problem). This paper will use a third type of problem 
domain with which to test the two theories - that of unlimited moves to problem solution. 
In all of the empirical work on insight, there is very little literature concerning the 
operational definition of what constitutes an impasse, other than it is a period of time 
where the problem solver has difficulty solving the problem. Knoblich et al. (2001) 
examined impasse based on fixation duration (the time spent looking at the problem, or 
components of the problem) by dividing each participant's solution time into three equal 
intervals. Fixation duration increased across consecutive intervals for problems that their 
theory predicted would be difficult, and did not for problems their theory predicted would 
be less complex (consistent with the idea that problem solvers spend more time in 
impasse for more complex insight problems). However, in the experiments covered 
previously, it was not clear when an impasse had occurred, or for how long the impasse 
lasted. This is because in the single-step matchstick domain, all problem solving is 
occurring within the head of the problem solver – the point at which problem solvers 
move from trying out different solutions to actually becoming stuck in the problem is not 
clear. In the nine-dot and eight-coin problems, no timing data were recorded, and so there 
is no way of knowing if problem solvers even encountered an impasse (in fact, the theory 
would suggest many do not, because they make distance-to-goal reducing moves until 
realizing failure too late). 
Defining what constitutes an impasse within a domain would seem to be critical 
because this is likely to be when the problem solver is re-representing the problem, so the 
point at which impasse occurs and the subsequent problem solving behavior following 
the impasse is where the chief interest lies in insight problem solving. It should be 
stressed at this point that it is not necessarily the case that insight always follows impasse 
– an impasse can lead to no insight at all, a partial insight (several of which would be 
required to achieve proper insight), or complete insight (Ohlsson, 1992). 
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This article seeks to further the literature regarding insight problem solving in four 
ways. First, to use an insight problem that is neither single-step nor limited move, but an 
unlimited move problem. Unlimited move problems have not yet been applied to either of 
the theories outlined. Second, to test the predictions of the theories outlined when applied 
to a novel unlimited move problem. Third, to operationalise the term impasse in order to 
examine both what constitutes an impasse, and to use the evidence (or lack of evidence) 
of impasse as tests of the theories. Pause length has been examined before in relation to 
impasse (e. g., Knoblich et al, 2001), but this paper will use a stricter definition of what 
constitutes an impasse. Fourth, to examine eye movements as well as overt problem 
moves – eye movement traces have rarely been used in insight problems yet have made 
successful contributions (e. g., Knoblich et al., 2001). Grant and Spivey (in press) used 
eye movement data on Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem. They found solvers focused 
more on the skin area than non-solvers, and when attention was drawn to this area in a 
second experiment, success rates significantly increased. Eye movement data would 
therefore seem to be useful in examining insight, and may well provide further evidence 
for when an impasse occurs. 
The Car Park Game 
The car park game is a relatively simple problem solving game which is used in 
children’s mathematics and problem solving, and more recently also exists as a board 
game (RushHour by Binary Arts). The aim of the game is to maneuver a taxi car out of a 
car park. The pathway from the taxi car to the exit is obstructed by other cars, and the 
object is to work out how these cars can be moved away from the exit pathway so that the 
taxi car is able to leave the car park. The game is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a 
simple problem scenario. Cars are moved by clicking the mouse pointer on the front or 
rear of the car to move the car forwards or backwards, and movement is restricted to the 
plane that the car is in (i. e., horizontal cars can only move left or right; vertical cars can 
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only move up or down). Clicking the mouse in the center of the car results in the car 
remaining stationary, as does an attempt to move a car forward/backward when its 
pathway in that direction is blocked (either by the wall of the car park or by another car). 
The exit pathway in the problem scenario in Figure 1 can be cleared by moving the 
rightmost vertical car upward one square, and then moving the horizontal car that blocks 
the exit pathway rightward. 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
The car park game can be seen as bearing a similarity to the eights puzzle (e. g., 
O'Hara & Payne, 1998) in terms of the type of moves that can be made. The eights puzzle 
comprises eight tiles numbered 1 to 8 which are represented on a 3-by-3 grid (i. e., one 
space is left empty). The object of the game is to maneuver the tiles into numerical order 
by manipulating them using the empty tile space. Another similar problem is the 
passalong test (Alexander, 1950). This comprises two sets of different colored figures in 
a square, where the initial state has all the figures of one color on the top part of the 
square and the figures of the other color on the bottom part of the square. The object is to 
maneuver the figures in order to reverse their order (i. e., to make the top color figures 
now be on the bottom, and the bottom color figures now be on the top). Both of these 
games involve moving objects around an enclosed grid in much the same way as the car 
park game. 
Insight in the Car Park Game 
Figure 2 shows a complex problem scenario. At first glance, the main area of 
complexity of the car park in Figure 2 over the car park in Figure 1 might be thought to 
be because the car park contains more cars. However, the car park in Figure 2 requires 
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that the taxi be moved before an exit pathway has been created. As we will see later, this 
presents a major stumbling block in the problem, with the taxi move being the insight that 
is required to solve the problem. The solution to the problem scenario in Figure 2 is as 
follows. The topmost car blocking the exit pathway (i. e., the horizontal car immediately 
below the taxi car) can be cleared by moving the two vertical cars in the top left hand 
corner upwards as far as possible so that the horizontal car can be moved leftward. The 
middle car blocking the exit pathway can be cleared by now moving the taxi car 
downward, enabling the horizontal car in the top right hand corner to be moved leftward 
such that space is created for the two rightmost vertical cars to both be moved upward. 
The middle car blocking the exit pathway can then be moved rightward. The bottommost 
car blocking the exit pathway can be cleared by moving the vertical car in the bottom left 
hand corner upward, such that the bottommost car can then be moved leftward. 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
The car park problem illustrated in Figure 2 is an insight problem where the main 
difficulty is a failure to consider moving the taxi car until the exit pathway has been 
cleared. The passalong problem has an insight of similar complexity, where some starting 
states require that moves be made that initially move the figures away from their final 
positions (Zamani & Richard, 2000). The difficulty observed on these problems is 
because of self-imposed constraints or ideas placed on the problem by the problem 
solver. 
The insight car park problem fits in with definitions of insight that have been 
proposed. For Weisberg (1995), insight must involve a discontinuity (several 
unsuccessful attempts at a problem followed by the successful solution), and a 
restructuring of the problem (i. e., simple trial and error should not be sufficient to 
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produce the problem solution). Failure to initially consider the taxi car amongst the 
possible cars to move will, by definition of the problem, result in initial failure. Several 
unsuccessful attempts at completing the problem may lead the problem solver to have the 
insight to realize that the taxi car must be included amongst possible cars to move, at 
which point the problem can be solved. 
The restructuring of the insight car park problem is fairly simplistic yet is similar to 
the restructuring that occurs in other insight problems considered by Weisberg. The socks 
problem, for example, involves asking the question “if you have black socks and brown 
socks in your drawer, mixed in the ratio 4: 5, how many socks would you need to take out 
to ensure having a pair of the same color?”. The insight here involves moving from a 
representation of the problem based on mathematics to a representation of the problem 
based on imagining yourself removing the socks. 
A clearer analogous example is the box holding the nails in the Duncker (1945) 
experiment which needs to be viewed as a shelf rather than as a box. In the insight car 
park problem, the taxi car has to be viewed in the same way as any of the other cars, and 
not as a special entity separate from the other cars. The change in representation (and 
therefore the insight) involves moving from one problem representation where the object 
in question is constrained in use, to another problem representation where those 
constraints are relaxed. 
Predictions for the Insight Car Park Problem from the Representational Change Theory 
The format of the car park game is very simple. The game layout consists of six 
squares by six squares, and all cars are one square in width and two squares in length. In 
terms of chunks, the game could not be said to have any chunks that can decompose into 
smaller entities, so chunk decomposition should not be the source of any problem 
difficulty. The main constraint in the problem is that cars can only be moved forwards or 
backwards – this applies to all cars and is stated in the instructions. A secondary 
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constraint which gets imposed on the problem by participants is that the taxi car cannot 
be moved before an exit pathway has been created. This self-imposed constraint may 
arise from people's experiences in using taxis (in that they are always the passenger in 
such vehicles). The constraint concerning the taxi move is the only constraint that can be 
relaxed in the problem. 
The representational change theory would thus predict at least one impasse at some 
point prior to moving the taxi, a stronger prediction being an impasse immediately prior 
to moving the taxi (i. e., the insight on the problem should be preceded by one or more 
impasses). Equally, a failure to solve the problem should not involve a single taxi move 
because otherwise this is a demonstration of that constraint being relaxed (i. e., while non- 
solvers may encounter impasse, their impasses must fail to generate the required insight 
of moving the taxi). 
Predictions for the Insight Car Park Problem from the Progress Monitoring Theory 
The progress monitoring theory is based on making moves which change the 
current state of the problem to be as close to the goal state as possible. The main goal in 
the car park game is to move the taxi car out of the car park, which involves sub-goals of 
moving other cars away from the exit pathway. Figure 2 shows that there are three cars 
that block the exit pathway, so reducing the current state of the problem to be close to the 
goal state involves moving these three cars away from the exit pathway. 
The progress monitoring theory employs a lookahead value which determines how 
many moves ahead people are able to look. In the insight car park problem, moving two 
of the three cars that block the exit pathway is trivial, after which point the problem 
solver will realize that the third car is very difficult to move. Therefore anyone with a 
lookahead of three or more will immediately realize that the problem is more complex 
than at first one may perceive. A person with a lookahead of two or less will not realize 
this until clearing the exit pathway of two cars. A person with a lookahead of one will 
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only consider one move at a time, and so will realize the problem difficulty only after 
moving the second car from the exit pathway. A person with a lookahead of two will also 
fail to notice the problem’s difficulty, because they too will move the first two cars from 
the exit pathway (it is assumed that problem solvers with a lookahead of two will not re- 
assess their problem solving after moving one of the cars away from the exit pathway 
because they will see from the start of the problem that removing two cars is trivial). 
Using MacGregor et al. ’s (2001) estimates of the distribution of lookahead values, 
then one can expect 32% of participants to have a lookahead of one, 32% of participants 
to have a lookahead of two, and 36% of participants to have a lookahead of three. This 
would mean that 64% of participants should encounter the majority of their impasses 
between moving the second car away from the exit pathway and moving the third car 
from the exit pathway. The remaining 36% of participants should encounter the majority 
of their impasses before moving a single car from the exit pathway. 
The progress monitoring theory states that insight (in the form of a search for 
alternative solutions) is only sought once criterion failure is reached – criterion failure 
being a failure to reach a minimum distance from the current state to the goal state. This 
relies on there being a set amount of moves for a problem (in order to calculate a 
minimum distance that needs to be travelled from the current state). For unlimited move 
problems, criterion failure under this description will never be reached. This presents an 
interesting problem for the theory – what happens once problem solvers reach the stage 
when they realize that moving the third car away from the exit pathway is not trivial? 
One would expect that the realization of a non-trivial move would cause an impasse, but 
this may depend on a person’s lookahead value and their insight potential (two variables 
that vary across individuals in the theory). One basic prediction that can be made is that 
people operating under a lookahead value of three should be more likely to solve the 
problem and solve it more quickly than people operating under a lookahead of one or two 
(which are essentially equal for this problem). This is because people with a lookahead of 
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three will realize the difficulty of the problem more quickly. Assigning lookahead values 
to participants will require the analysis of their behavior in the problem, by examining 
where impasses occur with respect to how many cars have been moved from the exit 
pathway. 
The progress monitoring theory makes no prediction regarding people who move 
the taxi and subsequently fail to solve the problem, because the theory does not deal with 
the relaxation of constraints. The tendency to search for insight is based on criterion 
failure, which in the insight car park problem amounts to realizing the difficulty of 
clearing the third car that blocks the exit pathway. Achieving insight will depend on the 
ability to realize this, combined with insight potential. 
Opposing Predictions for the Two Theories 
The key to the two theories making alternative predictions is to realize that if the 
layout of the insight problem remains the same, then the progress monitoring theory 
predicts that performance on the problem should also remain the same. This is because 
performance is governed by reducing the difference between the current state of the 
problem and the final state. The representational change theory on the other hand bases 
itself around the activation of task relevant and task irrelevant pieces of knowledge, and 
the re-representation of the problem in order to alter these activations and hence aid 
solving the problem. Being able to manipulate these while keeping the insight problem 
constant will therefore provide different predictions to the progress monitoring theory. 
Two ways of facilitating insight under the representational change theory would be 
to suppress the activation of task irrelevant knowledge, and to encourage the re- 
representation of the problem. The car park game allows both of these to be explored. 
The general activation of task knowledge should be lower if all of the problems which 
precede the insight problem are easy as opposed to presenting progressively more 
difficult preceding problems, because easy problems require less thought and 
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correspondingly should encourage less activation of task knowledge. Similarly, if the 
insight problem is presented differently to the preceding problems but in a way that 
remains consistent to its initial layout (e. g., by rotating the problem ninety degrees such 
that the exit pathway now appears on the right hand side), then re-representation of the 
problem should be encouraged relative to having the exit pathway in the same location as 
in all of the preceding problems. Both of these will be manipulated in order to test 
opposing predictions of the two theories. 
The progress monitoring theory would predict no difference on any measure for 
any of the manipulations, and the representational change theory would predict a 
difference between the manipulated conditions as opposed to the normal condition. For 
the representational change theory, the manipulated conditions should facilitate insight, 
so there should be more solvers in these conditions as opposed to the normal condition 
(although nothing can be predicted concerning which of the manipulated conditions 
should fare better). Predictions on other measures, such as the time taken to complete the 
insight problem, are more difficult to make because although insight should occur more 
quickly in the manipulated conditions, insight only involves the taxi move. All other 
moves are likely to be more difficult in the manipulated conditions because the nature of 
the manipulations are likely to lead to the remainder of the problem being more difficult. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty nine Psychology undergraduates (11 male, 28 female) participated as part of 
a participation points scheme. All were naive to the car park game. Participants were 
randomly assigned to each experimental condition, with 13 in the Normal condition (age 
range 18-44 years), 13 in the Rotated condition (age range 18-46 years) and 13 in the 
Easy condition (age range 18-34 years). 
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Materials 
A computer version of the car park game (written in Visual Basic by the author) 
was used complete with two sets of four practice problems and two types of insight 
problem. One set of practice problems involved simple problem scenarios only, the 
optimal number of moves to solution for each successive problem being 6, 6, 6, and 7, 
with only 1 car ever blocking the exit pathway, and the total number of cars in the car 
park always being 6. The other set of practice problems involved problem scenarios that 
were increasingly more difficult, the optimal number of moves to solution for each 
successive problem being 6, 8, 9, and 10, with the number of cars blocking the exit 
pathway being 1, 2, 3, and 3 respectively, and the total number of cars in the car park 
being 6, 9, 9, and 9. None of the practice problems required the taxi car to be moved in 
order to create an exit pathway. One type of insight problem was the same as that shown 
in Figure 2. The other type of insight problem was the same as that shown in Figure 2 but 
the whole problem was rotated ninety degrees such that the exit was now on the right 
hand side. 
The game was presented on a Hitachi Superscan 21" monitor. An ASL4000 eye 
tracker (accurate to within 1° of the visual angle) with remote floor mounted optics and 
an EHT tracking mirror were used to record eye movements. Point of gaze data were 
recorded every 50hz. The data were recorded onto video using a Panasonic AG-7350 
VCR with RS232 control. For the purposes of analysis, the eye tracking film was 
replayed on the same model VCR as it was recorded on. The ASL Eynal programme was 
used to create the fixation data, and EMAT (developed by University of Derby) was used 
to map the fixation data onto areas of interest in the insight car park problem. 
Design 
The independent variable was the problem scenario, with three levels: Normal (four 
progressively harder practice problems with the standard insight problem as shown in 
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Figure 2 appearing fifth); rotated (as for the normal condition but the insight problem is 
rotated ninety degrees such that the exit pathway is to the right); easy (as for the normal 
condition but the four practice problems are all simple). 
The dependent variables were recorded on a move by move basis, and involved 
both general measures and measures specific to eye movement data. The general 
measures were the time taken per move, the car moved, and the direction that the car was 
moved. For the eye movement data, the car park was split into 36 locations (a single 
location being one of the squares in the basic 6 by 6 car park grid). For each move, the 
number of times each location was fixated on between each move, and the total fixation 
time at each location between each move, were recorded. In addition, the number of 
erroneous clicks of the mouse (e. g., clicking in the center of the car) was recorded. 
Procedure 
The entire experiment was computer based. Participants were instructed to sit on a 
stool facing the monitor, resting their chin on a chin rest which was placed 80 centimeters 
from the monitor. Once comfortable, the participants were informed about the eye 
tracking equipment and asked to keep their heads as still as possible throughout the 
experiment. Participants were informed that they could take a break at any time during 
the experiment. Before running the car park game, participants were shown a calibration 
screen (a square of nine numbered dots). Calibration involved the participant looking at 
each dot in turn while the eye tracking equipment was adjusted to track the participants 
eye movements as well as possible. Re-calibration was carried out if the participant 
requested a break or they removed their chin from the chin rest. 
Once calibration had been achieved, participants were asked to use the mouse with 
their favored hand, and the car park program was run. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the three experimental conditions. The car park program first 
displayed a set of instructions which outlined the car park game. The instructions were as 
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follows. You are going to be shown a car park which has cars parked in it. Your task is to 
get the black taxi car out of the car park so that it can go out and pick up a customer. All 
cars can be moved forward by clicking on the front part of the car, and backward by 
clicking on the rear part of the car. Click OK to start! 
Once the participant was satisfied that they had understood the instructions, they 
began the game. Four initial non-insight car park problem scenarios were presented first. 
Depending on the experimental condition, these either increased in difficulty (normal and 
rotated conditions) or were all relatively easy to complete (easy condition). The fifth 
problem scenario was the insight problem, as illustrated in Figure 2. Depending on the 
experimental condition, this problem was either presented with the exit located in the 
same position as for all preceding problems (normal and easy conditions) or the whole 
problem was rotated ninety degrees such that the exit was located to the right (rotated 
condition). 
Due to the eye tracking equipment being relatively uncomfortable, if participants 
were adamant they could not solve the insight problem they were immediately given a 
hint (“You have to move the taxi car before you can create an exit pathway”). 
Data Analysis 
For the fixation data, only fixations that lasted longer than 100 ms were used for 
analysis. The point of gaze data were translated into fixation data by the ASL Eynal 
programme. The fixation data were then assigned to locations in the insight car park 
problem using EMAT. The car park area was divided into 36 locations (one per square on 
the 6-by-6 grid). Each fixation was assigned to a location where possible (fixations 
landing outside the car park or in between two or more locations were discarded) on a 
move-by-move basis. This meant that for each move, all of the locations that were fixated 
on could be obtained, together with the number of fixations in that location and the total 
time spent fixating in that location. 
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The eye movement data were not of sufficient quality for 2 of the participants (1 in 
the normal condition and 1 in the rotated condition). These were not included in any eye 
movement related analyses. 
The way in which an impasse was defined is as follows: A participant has reached 
impasse for the current move if the fixation time for the move is greater than or equal to 
the mean fixation time for the participant plus two standard deviations. Under this 
definition, impasse is sensitive to the individual differences in fixation times across 
participants. Fixation time is preferred over the time taken per move because it will better 
reflect the time spent on task (note that using fixation time means that 2 participants will 




The mean number of moves made to solve the practice problems was 14. 15 (3. 99), 
12. 90 (3. 22), and 8. 54 (1. 29) in the normal, rotated, and easy conditions respectively. 
The 
mean time to solution for the practice problems was 22. 48 seconds (7. 37), 21. 23 s 
(10. 40), and 9. 63 s (2. 77) in the normal, rotated, and easy conditions respectively. 
There 
was a main effect of condition for both the number of moves made to solve the practice 
problems (F(2, 36)=12. 13, p<. 001) and the time taken to solution for the practice 
problems (F(2, 36)=11. 50, p<. 001). Post-hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that problems in 
the easy condition were solved in less moves and in less time than the normal and rotated 
conditions (p<. 005 or better in all comparisons). 
General Results 
There were 31 participants who solved the problem without the need of a hint. 
There were 8 participants who required the hint in order to solve the problem (6 in the 
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normal condition, 1 in the rotated condition, and 1 in the easy condition). All 8 
participants are treated as non-solvers of the problem and remain in all analyses. 
The main constraint in the insight car park problem was suggested to be the 
reluctance in moving the taxi car before the exit pathway had been cleared. This suggests 
that the taxi move will be more difficult relative to other moves. Figure 3 shows the mean 
fixation times and the mean move times for the 3 moves preceding the first taxi move, for 
the taxi move itself, and for the three moves immediately succeeding the first taxi move. 
A comparison between the average time for the 3 moves preceding the taxi move, the taxi 
move itself, and the average of the 3 moves succeeding the taxi move showed a main 
effect for both the time taken per move (F(2, 76)=7. 77, p<. 005) and the fixation time per 
move (F(2, 72)=7. 76, p<. 005). Post-hoc comparisons showed significant differences 
between the taxi move and the preceding and succeeding moves in all cases (p<. 01 or 
better in all comparisons). This confirms that the taxi move proves to be a stumbling 
block in completing the insight car park problem. 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Results Pertinent to the Representational Change Theory 
For the purposes of testing out the representational change theory’s predictions, all 
participants will be considered together, rather than in their respective conditions, 
because it is the point at which impasses occur relative to the first taxi move that is 
important, rather than whether insight was achieved more quickly in one condition than 
another. 
The first prediction from the representational change theory is that solvers of the 
problem should encounter impasse before moving the taxi car. Of the 37 participants who 
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could be analyzed under our definition of impasse (i. e., those having eye movement data 
of a sufficient quality), there were 30 solvers and 7 non-solvers. For the 30 solvers, all 
encountered impasse before moving the taxi, with 5 encountering impasse immediately 
prior to moving the taxi. There is also a clear trend in the solvers for the taxi move taking 
longer relative to other moves - the time spent fixating on the problem was longer for the 
taxi move than any of the three moves preceding the taxi move or succeeding the taxi 
move (F(2, 58)=5. 40, p<. 01), and the raw time spent on the taxi move was longer also 
(F(2, 60)=5. 17, p<. 01). Post-hoc Bonferroni tests revealed the taxi move to take 
significantly longer than the three moves preceding and succeeding the taxi move (p<. 05 
or better in all comparisons). 
All of the non-solvers encountered at least 1 impasse before being given the hint, 
but unlike the solvers, they did not achieve the subsequent insight from the impasse and 
thus needed a hint to solve the problem. 
The second prediction from the representational change theory is that non-solvers 
of the problem should not move the taxi car until after receiving the hint. In total, there 
were 8 non-solvers of the problem. Of these, 3 did not move the taxi from its original 
position before the hint, leaving 5 who move the taxi yet fail to solve the problem. These 
5 move the taxi an average of 2. 00 times each, yet on each occasion the taxi was always 
returned to its original position. Why should the problem not be solved once participants 
have relaxed the constraint of not moving the taxi? Realizing the significance of moving 
the taxi involves also realizing that the right hand block of cars need to be moved in order 
to create space for a car to be moved from the exit pathway. In this case, any impasse that 
precedes a taxi move should examine the right hand area of the car park (the rightmost 12 
locations involving two horizontal cars sandwiched by two vertical ones). If non-solvers 
are moving the taxi as part of some other goal, then it would make sense that they do not 
fixate on this area often during the nearest impasse that precedes a taxi move, whereas 
solvers should fixate on this area relatively often. 
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The fixation data for the nearest impasse that preceded a taxi move (each taxi move 
where the taxi is in its topmost position; fixation data for the 37 relevant participants) 
shows that there is a significant difference in the proportion of fixations made in the 
rightmost area between solvers and non-solvers (for solvers, 24% of their fixations 
examine the rightmost twelve locations, 9% for non-solvers; F(1, 39)=6. 50, p<. 05). The 
difference in the proportion of time spent fixating on the rightmost area during the 
impasse is also significant (for solvers, 19% of the fixation time is spent on the rightmost 
area, 8% for non-solvers; F(1, 39)=5. 56, p<. 05). 
The predictions from the representational change theory would seem to be 
supported in general. Solvers all encounter impasse before moving the taxi. For non- 
solvers, almost half fail to move the taxi before being given a hint, with the results 
suggesting that the remainder may well be moving the taxi as part of a sub-goal whereby 
the significance of moving the taxi is not noticed. 
Results Pertinent to the Progress Monitoring Theory Predictions 
For the purposes of testing out the progress monitoring theory’s predictions, all 39 
participants will be considered together, because what is of interest is the relative number 
of impasses which occur as each car is moved away from the exit pathway, rather than 
whether insight was achieved more quickly in one condition than another. 
Note that the number of cars moved from the exit pathway only includes the 
original cars that blocked the exit pathway – for example, if a different car was moved to 
now be blocking the pathway, this would not count as another car blocking the pathway. 
This is because it is assumed that the extra car has been moved in order to facilitate the 
maneuvering of other cars. 
There are three keys areas for impasse: impasses occurring before the first car is 
moved from the exit pathway, impasses occurring between moving the first and second 
cars from the exit pathway, and impasses occurring between moving the second and third 
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cars from the exit pathway (no impasses occur outside of these key areas). By examining 
where the majority of impasses lie with respect to how many cars have been moved from 
the exit pathway, participants can be assigned to lookahead values. 
MacGregor et al. (2001) predict that 64% of participants will have the majority of 
their impasses between moving the second car and third car out of the exit pathway (i. e., 
employing a lookahead of one or two). The remaining 36% of participants will have the 
majority of their impasses before moving the first car out of the exit pathway (i. e., 
employing a lookahead of three). 
Let us consider how to measure which of the three key areas for impasse has the 
majority of impasses. There are two ways to look at impasse: the number of impasses and 
the time spent in impasse. There are also two ways in which to measure where the 
majority lies: the majority being the area which has more impasse than either of the other 
two areas, or the majority being the area which has more impasse than the sum of the 
impasse in the other two areas. This results in four definitions of the “majority of 
impasses”. Table 1 shows the distribution of lookahead values for each definition of 
majority of impasses. 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Participants who have a lookahead of one or two should have the majority of their 
impasses between moving the second and third cars from the exit pathway. Participants 
who have a lookahead of three should have the majority of their impasses before moving 
the first car from the exit pathway. Very few participants should have the majority of 
their impasses occurring between moving the first and second cars. 
When trying to assign participants to lookahead values, it is clear that the raw 
number of impasses is not a sufficient method – the values do not support MacGregor et 
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al. ’s predictions. There are roughly an equal amount of participants assigned to lookahead 
values one and two, and to lookahead value three, whereas it was predicted there would 
be a 64%/36% split. However, when considering the time spent in impasse, the figures 
are much closer to the predictions, with 20 participants (54%) assigned to lookahead one 
or two, and 11 participants (30%) assigned to lookahead three. Across all definitions, 
there are very few participants who have the majority of their impasses between moving 
the first and second cars, as predicted by the progress monitoring theory. 
The time spent in impasse is the better predictor of how many participants should 
be assigned to each lookahead value. Existing studies of eye movements in insight (none 
of which measure raw number of impasses) have used fixation duration as a measure of 
impasse (e. g., Knoblich et al., 2001; Grant & Spivey, in press). Time spent in impasse 
will therefore be used in examining MacGregor et al. ’s predictions, and the fact that the 
raw number of impasses in not a good measure will be returned to in the discussion 
section. 
The figures in column 3 of Table 1 represent the best match to MacGregor et al’s 
predictions and it will be these that are used in examining the difference in performance 
between participants with a lookahead of one or two, and those with a lookahead of three. 
Table 2 shows the performance of participants assigned to each lookahead value. It is 
clear that the data support the predictions of the progress monitoring theory: Performance 
for participants with a lookahead of three is far better than that of participants having a 
lookahead of one or two, in terms of the time taken to solution, the number of moves 
made to solution, and the number of participants able to solve the problem. A comparison 
of the solvers shows that those assigned a lookahead value of three complete the problem 
more quickly (F(1, 23)=26. 81, p<. 001) and complete the problem in fewer moves 
(F(1, 23)=10. 94, p<. 01), as predicted by the progress monitoring theory. The non-solvers 
are not included in any time/move analyses because their inclusion will skew results, 
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especially since only participants who were assigned a lookahead value of one or two fail 
to solve the problem. 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Results Pertinent to Opposing Predictions of the Two Theories 
The representational change theory predicts that the insight problem will be solved 
more often in the easy and rotated conditions relative to the normal condition, whereas 
the progress monitoring theory predicts no difference in performance across all 
conditions. Table 3 shows the performance measures for each condition. The number of 
erroneous clicks on cars (e. g., clicking in the center of the car, or trying to move a car 
forward or backward when that direction is either blocked by the car park wall or by 
another car) is included because it is a measure of task difficulty. Erroneous clicks signify 
frustration with the task – all participants should be fluent in moving cars because they 
solved four problems before attempting the insight problem. 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------  
Table 3 shows a clear trend towards better performance in the rotated and easy 
conditions. To ease statistical examination, the rotated and easy conditions will be 
collapsed into one (the representational change theory only makes the prediction that 
there will be a difference between the normal and rotated/easy conditions). There is a 
significant difference between the normal and rotated/easy conditions for the number of 
solvers (Fisher’s Exact, p=0. 01) and for the number of erroneous clicks (U=76. 00, N=39, 
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p<. 01) that are made. However, there is no difference between the solvers in the normal 
and rotated/easy conditions for the number of moves to solution (F(1, 29)=1. 56, p>. 05) 
or 
for the time taken to solution (F(1, 29)=1. 90, p>. 05). 
These data provide strong support for the representational change theory’s 
prediction that there will be a difference in success rates between the normal and 
rotated/easy conditions. Participants in the normal condition show a higher degree of 
failure (i. e., the need for a hint in order to solve the problem) and show a higher degree of 
frustration (the majority of participants making erroneous clicks of the mouse, 
presumably out of frustration). The number of moves and the time taken in completing 
the task are less clear in providing any support for either theory. 
Discussion 
The car park problem solving task has shown support for both of the theories 
outlined in this paper. For the representational change theory, the prediction that those 
who solved the problem will encounter impasse before the critical problem move 
(moving the taxi) is strongly supported, and the prediction that non-solvers will fail to 
move the taxi is weakly supported (with the suggestion that those non-solvers who 
moved the taxi did so as part of a sub-goal which did not involve the critical right hand 
side cars). For the progress monitoring theory, the prediction that those who use a 
lookahead of three will perform better than those with a lookahead of one or two is 
strongly supported. People with a lookahead of three encounter impasse more quickly 
and therefore achieve insight more quickly. 
In terms of the opposing predictions of the two theories, the representational change 
theory’s predictions are better supported than those of the progress monitoring theory, 
with problem solvers being more successful on the insight problem when given easy 
practice problems or when given a rotated version of the insight problem. Insight in the 
representational change theory is the re-representation of a problem in order to alter the 
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activation of task knowledge (to make task relevant knowledge more active). In the easy 
condition, insight was facilitated by using simple practice problems such that the 
opportunity for irrelevant task knowledge to become active was minimal. In the rotated 
condition, the exit was rotated ninety degrees so that it now appeared on the right hand 
side of the car park. Insight was facilitated by encouraging participant’s to re-represent 
the problem because of a complete alteration of the problem scenario to what they had 
previously been exposed to. Neither of the manipulations sought to explicitly try and 
relax the taxi-move constraint – they merely sought to encourage its relaxation by 
altering other aspects of the representation of the insight problem. 
In intuitive general problem solving terms, both of the manipulations made should 
mean that the problem solver has more difficulty in solving the problem. Giving only 
easy practice problems sets up the problem solver to expect a full set of easy problems, so 
when they encounter the insight problem they should have more difficulty than those in 
the normal condition who have encountered successively harder problems and from this 
experience should be more adept at solving the insight problem. This is because the prior 
experience of only simple problems should mean that problem solvers are less exposed to 
the types of correct operators (i. e., moves) that should be applied to the problem (e. g., 
Lovett and Anderson, 1996). Those encountering the rotated insight problem should 
similarly be disadvantaged because now suddenly the nature of the problem has changed 
against what the participant was expecting. 
The counter-intuitive results may also be expected to be shown for the time taken 
and moves made to solution. However, the results were less clear for these measures, and 
this is not surprising because the car park problem is an unlimited move problem. The 
insight in the problem only affects the taxi move, with all other moves unaffected. The 
other moves should be more difficult to make in the manipulated conditions relative to 
the normal condition. For example, in the easy condition, the fact that participants had 
much less exposure to the car park game prior to the insight problem (their practice 
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problems are completed much more quickly than the other conditions, see practice 
problems section) is likely to hinder their general car park problem solving performance 
even though it results in facilitating insight. 
The representational change theory predicts improved success rates in the easy and 
rotated conditions as compared to the normal condition, which is the exact opposite to 
what would intuitively be expected. This is an important finding and one that needs to be 
explored further. Primarily, it enables the activation of problem knowledge (as 
manipulated in the easy condition) and the re-representing of a problem (as manipulated 
in the rotated condition) to be compared in terms of how they affect performance. 
The testing of the predictions of the two theories has hinged upon the 
operationalisation of the term impasse: An impasse was defined within the scope of the 
problem as being when the fixation time for the current move was greater than or equal to 
the mean fixation time for the participant plus two standard deviations. This definition 
served to support both of the theories outlined. 
When assigning lookahead values in the progress monitoring theory, both the raw 
number of impasses and the time spent in impasse were used. The raw number of 
impasses did not serve as a good predictor of lookahead values, whereas the time spent in 
impasse provided a good match to the predicted ratios of lookahead values. The time 
spent in impasse has also been used to examine insight in the past (e. g., Knoblich et al., 
2001). Given that insight does not always follow impasse, it would make sense that 
insight is more likely to occur when the problem solver spends more time in impasse. 
The definition of insight that has been used in this paper therefore specifies a 
minimum cut-off point for a pause in problem solving to be considered an impasse, and it 
is the time spent in these impasses that is the important factor, and not the raw number of 
impasses. This is consistent with previous literature concerning what occurs during an 
impasse. The Gestalt psychologists (e. g., Kohler, 1969) proposed that productive 
thinking, or thinking about the problem in a different way, occurs during impasse. 
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Subsequent insight would mean that the problem solver has restructured the problem in a 
way that can result in its solution. 
Schooler, Ohlsson, and Brooks (1993) suggest that impasse might involve, amongst 
other things, the spreading activation of memory elements that are important in the 
problem. The activation of memory elements that are not important in solving the 
problem need to decay and allow those memory elements that are important to become 
active. This change in activation must be an unconscious process because they find that 
verbalisation leads to poorer performance on insight problems. In addition, participants 
are not able to guess how close they are to obtaining the solutions of insight problems, 
which is not the case for non-insight problems (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). 
Kaplan and Simon (1990) on the other hand suggest that what occurs during an 
impasse is a search for an appropriate heuristic (a rule of thumb which can be used to 
constrain the problem so as to reduce the search for the solution) within a problem space 
(Newell & Simon, 1972). They show that hints serve to constrain the problem space and 
therefore help the problem solver to find the appropriate heuristic to solve the problem. 
All of the above hypotheses concerning what occurs in the problem solver’s mind 
during impasse would suggest that the longer the duration of an impasse, the more the 
likelihood of subsequent insight being achieved. What has been done here is the 
provision of a systematic method of classifying when a person encounters an impasse. 
Defining impasse in workable terms has rarely been attempted before. The results here 
have shown that being able to identify when impasses are occurring helps in testing 
theories of insight. In addition, it will help in examining impasse. Once it is known when 
an impasse is occurring, the type of behavior that occurs during impasse and immediately 
after impasse can be analyzed and compared to behavior that occurs in the absence of 
impasse. 
The research here also provides a case for the merging of the two theories outlined, 
partly because the descriptions of each theory deal with different areas of insight, and 
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partly because they each make distinctly different predictions that are nevertheless 
supported in the insight car park problem. The progress monitoring theory essentially 
covers insight up to the point at which insight is sought. MacGregor et al. (2001) consider 
that insight might involve the discovery of novel moves which can be stored as promising 
states, but this hypothesis is not expanded into a theory of how insight occurs. The 
progress monitoring theory is able to predict, based on the task at hand, when participants 
are most likely to seek alternative solutions and hence when participants will seek insight. 
The representational change theory on the other hand covers how insight will be 
achieved, and therefore the point at which insight is sought is the beginning point of the 
theory. 
The results presented illustrate how the theories can be merged with regard to when 
alternative solutions (i. e., insight) are considered. For the solvers, assuming their impasse 
leads to subsequent insight, a strict version of the representational change theory predicts 
that the impasse should occur immediately prior to moving the taxi. On the other hand, 
the progress monitoring theory predicts that the location of the impasse will be 
determined by lookahead. If a participant has a lookahead of three, then they should 
impasse early on in the problem. In contrast, a participant with a lookahead of one should 
impasse later on in the problem. The progress monitoring theory's predictions were 
supported in the results presented. This clearly shows the benefits of merging the two 
theories – the progress monitoring theory provides an explanation of why some people 
will not show impasse immediately prior to the solution move as predicted by the 
representational change theory. Obviously the bridging point between the two needs 
further specification, but providing an integrative theory of insight which encapsulates 
both of the theories covered here would seem to be the way forward in insight research. 
This paper has tested two theories of insight using a problem solving task in which 
neither theory has previously been applied: A problem where there are unlimited moves 
to solution. It showed that predictions could be made from both theories regarding 
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problem performance, and those predictions were borne out by the data. The notion of 
impasse was able to be defined in realizable terms which was then used to test the 
predictions made by the theories. The data provided support, albeit not unequivocal, for 
the representational change theory when examining opposing predictions from the 
theories, and this area is one which needs examining further. The results here have shown 
that the use of eye movement data (in terms of providing a source of definition for 
impasse) could be an important area in insight research, and that theories of insight can 
be applied to problems outside of those which the theories were designed to explain. 
Further research needs to examine impasse further by considering the merging of the two 
theories described, and by comparing problem solving behavior pre- and post-impasse in 
order to examine further the factors which influence how quickly insight is achieved. 
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Table 1 
Key Areas where the Majority of Impasses Lie for the Four Definitions of “Majority of 
Impasses”. 
 
 Number of impasses Time spent in impasse 




either of other 2 
areas 
Greater than 
sum of other 
two areas 
Greater than 
either of other 2 
areas 
Greater than 
sum of other 
two areas 
Before first car 
moved 
9 9 11 11 
Between first 
and second cars 




11 13 20 20 
No specific 
area 
13 11 0 0 
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Table 2 
Performance of Participants when Assigned to Lookahead Values of One/Two, or Three. 
 
 Lookahead one/two Lookahead three 
Solvers 14 11 
Non-solvers 6 0 
Moves to solution (solvers only) 37. 14 (18. 79) 21. 36 (5. 14) 
Time to solution (solvers only) 92. 29 s (43. 33) 42. 73 s (11. 45) 
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Table 3 
Car Park Performance Across the Three Experimental Conditions. 
 
 Condition 
 Normal Rotated Easy 
Solvers 7 12 12 
Non-solvers 6 1 1 
Participants making 
erroneous clicks 
9 3 2 
Number of 
erroneous clicks 
5. 31 (9. 11) 0. 31 (0. 63) 0. 38 (0. 96) 
Moves to solution 
(solvers only) 
23. 00 (7. 57) 32. 58 (17. 88) 29. 33 (14. 90) 
Time to solution 
(solvers only) 
53. 43 s (22. 00) 95. 83 s (49. 77) 59. 00 s (28. 95) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. A Simple Car Park Problem. 
Figure 2. The Insight Car Park Problem. 
Figure 3. Mean Fixation Time and Mean Move Time for the First Taxi Car Move, and the 
Three Moves Preceding and Succeeding the First Taxi Move. 
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